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1I.     Introduction
On a global scale wage differences are enormous across countries ranging from,
for example, 1,10 € per hour in China to above 27 € per hour in Denmark, Germany or
Norway (see, e.g. Sinn (2007)). These wage differences constitute a central explanation
for the increasingly significant business practice of international outsourcing. In
countries with strong labour market imperfections large-scale outsourcing is often
considered to pose a significant threat for employment, in particular for the low-skilled
labour force segment. These concerns are often expressed by labour unions, and unions
often accommodate the particular concern for the low-skilled labour force segment by
advocating solidaristic wage policies.1
In this study we analyze the effects of international outsourcing to low-wage
countries on equilibrium unemployment in high-wage countries characterized by strong
labour market imperfections. More precisely, we focus on a heterogeneous labour
market where wages are determined by a monopoly labour union endowed with
solidaristic objectives. We address the following questions: How does outsourcing
affect wage formation, and in particular wage dispersion, in a heterogeneous labour
market, where the labour union operates with some degree of wage solidarity? What are
the effects of outsourcing on equilibrium unemployment among high-skilled and low-
skilled workers? How are these effects related to the degree of wage solidarity? How
can we characterize the aggregate effects of outsourcing on equilibrium unemployment
in the presence of solidaristic wage policies? What is the optimal production mode
under imperfectly competitive and segmented labour markets?
We find that the own wage elasticity and the cross wage elasticity of the low-
skilled labor demand depend positively on the amount of outsourcing, whereas all these
elasticities are independent of the amount of outsourcing for the demand of the high-
skilled labour. A higher share of outsourced production will decrease the wage set by a
1 See also Stefanova (2006) concerning the East-West dichotomy of outsourcing in the European
union in the context of its 2004 eastward enlargement.
2monopoly union for the low-skilled labour, and increase wage for the high-skilled
labour. Consequently, outsourcing promotes the wage dispersion between the two
labour force segments. The labour union will magnify, and not dampen, this tendency
by adopting a solidaristic wage policy.
Outsourcing and wage solidarity have opposite employment effects among the
high-skilled and low-skilled workers. Increased outsourcing increases equilibrium
unemployment among the high-skilled workers, whereas it reduces it among the low-
skilled workers. By combining these effects we draw the general conclusion that
outsourcing will reduce economy-wide equilibrium unemployment under the
reasonable condition that the proportion of the high-skilled workers is sufficiently low.
Furthermore, increased wage solidarity reduces equilibrium unemployment for the
high-skilled workers, whereas it increases equilibrium unemployment for the low-
skilled workers. Finally, we characterize the optimal production mode from the firm’s
point of view. We find that when the firm faces a labour union with a higher degree of
wage solidarity this will increase the positive returns from outsourcing through the
effects of solidarity on the wage formation of the low-skilled workers. Overall our
paper adds to the existing literature by analyzing the effects of outsourcing and wage
solidarity between the high-skilled and the low-skilled workers on wage formation and
equilibrium unemployment within the framework of imperfectly competitive labour
markets.
We are not aware of any existing study which would have evaluated the
employment consequences of outsourcing in an imperfectly competitive labour market
with a heterogeneous labour force represented by a labour union with solidaristic
preferences. A number of studies have, however, explored some related effects of
outsourcing. Danthine and Hunt (1994) have both theoretically and empirically studied
the effects of international outsourcing and foreign direct investment on wage
formation in the home country. They showed that higher product market integration
implies intensified product market competition, which moderates wage increases in
unionized and homogeneous labour markets. Glass and Saggi (2001) have theoretically
studied the causes of outsourcing and its effects, finding that higher international
outsourcing lowers the relative wage of domestic workers and increases the profits,
3creating greater incentives for innovation. Egger and Egger (2003) have empirically
studied the impact of a decline in trade barriers on outsourcing of low-skilled labour
and argued that outsourcing raises the relative wages of high-skilled labour in the home
country, if the low-skilled labour is unionized in the home country. In terms of empirics
Feenstra and Hanson (1999) have studied the impact of foreign outsourcing and
technology on wages using U.S. data over the period 1979-1990. According to their
findings, wages of low-skilled workers have fallen relative to those of high-skilled
workers. Yan (2006) has used Canadian data to show that both foreign outsourcing and
ICT (information and communication technologies) play important roles to increase the
demand for skills independently of whether it is measured by the wage-bill share or
employment share of non-production workers.
Recently, Senses (2006) has argued that an increased probability of outsourcing
associated with a decline in foreign intermediate input prices and an increase in the
elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic inputs might increase the wage
elasticity of labour demand. He has provided relevant empirical evidence, according to
which a production mode with more outsourcing increases the wage elasticity of labour
demand. As mentioned earlier, in our model we show that both the own wage elasticity
and cross wage elasticity of low-skilled labour depends positively on outsourcing.
Our study proceeds as follows. Section II presents the basic structure of the model
as well as the time sequence of the decisions regarding outsourcing, wage setting and
labour demand for the separate segments of high-skilled and low-skilled workers. We
study the segmented labour demand for the heterogeneous labour force in section III,
whereas we focus on wage determination by a monopoly labour union in Section IV.
Section V explores how the production mode and the union’s degree of wage solidarity
affect equilibrium unemployment. In section VI we characterize the optimal production
mode in the presence of the imperfectly competitive and segmented labour market.
Finally, we present concluding comments in Section VII.
4II. Basic Framework
We design on a model with heterogeneous workers in an imperfectly competitive
domestic labour market. At stage 1, in the long run, firms commit themselves to the
production mode. Under outsourced production firms acquire the low-skilled labour
input at the factor price c , which is lower than the wage of the domestic low-skilled
workers. Moreover, there is a sunk cost of establishing capacity for foreign outsourced
production. In order to exploit M units of the outsourced low-skilled labour input firms
have to make the irreversible investment )(Mg  with the properties that 0)(' >Mg  and
0)('' >Mg . This captures the idea the exploitation of the marginal cost advantages
offered by production in low-wage countries typically also requires that the firms make
irreversible investments into the establishment of networks of suppliers in the relevant
low-wage countries.
At stage 2, conditional on the firm’s commitment to a production mode, the
labour union determines the wages for the high-skilled and low-skilled workers subject
to the labour demands for each type of labour by the firms. At stage 3 firms make
domestic employment decisions with respect to both the high-skilled and low-skilled
workers by taking wage rates and outsourcing as given.
The time sequence of decisions is summarized in Figure 1 and the decisions at
each stage are analyzed by using backward induction.
        stage 1                      stage 2                         stage 3
                                                                                                  time
outsourcing               wage setting             high-skilled labour demand H  and
 decision M Hw and Lw                low-skilled  labour demand L
Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions
5This timing structure seems plausible when the implementation of a production
mode with outsourcing requires irreversible investments concerning the establishment
of a network of foreign suppliers. The relative timing of wage formation and
outsourcing could also be reversed. Such a reversed timing structure would be relevant
if the firms could flexibly adjust their production mode, and decide whether to initiate
foreign outsourcing, once the domestic wages are determined. Skaksen (2004) has
analyzed this case using a Cobb-Douglas production function applied to a
homogeneous labour force.
III.   High-Skilled and Low-Skilled Labour Demand
At stage 3 the firm decides about the high-skilled labour demand H  and the low-
skilled labour demand L  in order to maximize the profit function
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by taking the wage for high-skilled labour, Hw , the wage for low-skilled labour, Lw ,
and the outsourced low-skilled labour input M as given. We assume a Cobb-Douglas-
type production function2 with decreasing returns to scale according to
[ ]rg aa MLHMLHF -+= 1)(),,( , where 10 << r  and 10 << a . The parameter 0>g
captures the productivity of the outsourced low-skilled labour input relative to the
domestic low-skilled labour input. The marginal products of the high-skilled labour and
the low-skilled labour are aaH MLaHXF
--- += 111 )( gr r  and
aa
L MLaHXF
-- +-= ))(1(1 gr r , respectively, where aa MLHX -+= 1)( g .
2 Koskela and Stenbacka (2007) have adopted a CES production function to analyze equilibrium
unemployment and optimal outsourcing under labour market imperfections with a homogeneous
labour force.
6Concerning the impact of the outsourced low-skilled labour input on the marginal
products of domestic labour inputs one can show that
0)1()( 111 >-+= --- grgr r aaMLHXF aHM                                                            (2a)
and
[ ] 0)1(1)1()( 11 <---+-= --- rggr r aaMLHXF aaLM . (2b)
Thus, for this production function the domestic high-skilled labour input and the
outsourced low-skilled labour input are complements, whereas the low-skilled domestic
labour input and the outsourced low-skilled labour input are substitutes. Ethier (2005)
has introduced a partly related production function to analyze the decision between
international outsourcing and in-house production in his analysis of the effect of
globalization on the skill premium.
Given both the outsourcing decision and the wages determined by the monopoly
labour union the first-order conditions characterizing the domestic high-skilled and
low-skilled labour demands are
[ ] 0)()( 1111 =-++= ---- HaaaaH wMLaHMLH ggrp r (3a)
[ ] 0)()1()( 11 =-+-+= --- LaaaaL wMLHaMLH glrp r  .                  (3b)
These first-order conditions imply the following relationship between the high-skilled
labour ( H ), and the low-skilled labour inclusive of outsourcing ( ML g+ )
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a
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Substituting (4) into (3b) gives (see Appendix A) the low-skilled labour demand, which
can be expressed as follows
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H  denotes the cross
wage elasticity of the low-skilled labour with respect to the high-skilled wage in the
absence of outsourcing, i.e. when 0=M . These elasticities are higher with weaker
decreasing returns to scale.
According to (5), a more extensive outsourcing activity will decrease the low-
skilled labour demand. This feature is consistent with empirical evidence. For instance,
Diehl (1999) has presented empirical evidence for German manufacturing industries in
support of this hypothesis. Moreover, Görg and Hanley (2005) have used plant-level
data of the Irish electronic sector to empirically conclude that international outsourcing
reduces plant-level labour demand.
In the presence of outsourcing the wage elasticities of the low-skilled labour can
be written as follows
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Hence, outsourcing raises both wage elasticities, i.e. 0ˆ >
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we mentioned earlier, Senses (2006) has recently presented empirical evidence
according to which higher outsourcing increases the wage elasticity of labour demand,
which lies in conformity with our analysis of the demand for low-skilled labour.
Moreover, and importantly, the elasticity of low-skilled labour with respect to
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elasticity of low-skilled labour demand is positive. Differentiating this with respect to
M  gives
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This means that higher outsourcing, ceteris paribus, will increase the outsourcing
elasticity of the low-skilled labour.
Substituting (5) into (4) gives the following demand for high-skilled labour
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Me  These elasticities are also higher with weaker decreasing returns to
scale, but unlike the case with low-skilled labour both the own wage and cross wage
labor demand elasticities for high-skilled labour are independent of outsourcing.
We can now summarize our findings regarding the properties for heterogeneous labour
demand in the presence of outsourcing as follows.
Proposition 1 In the presence of outsourcing
(a) the own wage elasticity, the cross wage elasticity and the outsourcing
elasticity for the low-skilled labour demand depend positively on the amount of
outsourcing, whereas
(b) the own wage elasticity and the cross wage elasticity for the high-skilled
labour demand are independent of the amount of outsourcing.
9IV.   Wage Formation by Monopoly Labour Union for High-Skilled
and Low-Skilled Workers
We now proceed to investigate the wage formation and continue to consider the
acquired outsourcing M  as given. The monopoly union determines the wages in
anticipation of optimal in-house employment decisions by the firm.
The objective function of the labour union with heterogenous workers as
members is assumed to be HbwLbwU HHLL ))(1()( --+-= aa , where )( HL bb  is the
(exogenous) outside option available to the low-skilled (high-skilled) workers and
a ( )1 a-  describes the trade union’s relative preference for the low-skilled (high-
skilled) workers. In the presence of wage solidarity we have 2/1>a , whereas 2/1=a
captures that the labour union has no relative preferences differentiation across the two
labour force segments.3 Ceteris paribus, a solidaristic (egalitarian) wage policy entails a
balanced wage structure which implies restraint on wage increases for high-paid groups
of employees with above-average productivity with larger percentage rises for low-paid
groups with below-average productivity.4 In general, the tradition of solidaristic wage
policy is stronger in Europe than in the USA and consistent with that the wage
dispersion in the USA is clearly greater than in the European countries (for empirics,
see e.g. Schulten (2002)).
Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006) have analyzed the effects of global and national
technological change on employment and relative wages under “fair” wage constraints.
But they assume that the firms are wage setters, but they also emphasize that a fruitful
avenue for further research is to allow for imperfectly competitive labour markets.
3     See also Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), p. 401-403 concerning the monopoly labour union
specification.
4      Agell and Lommerud (1992) have developed and explored the alternative rationales for egalitarian
wage objectives of the labour union. One explanation for egalitarian wage patterns is simply that
the labour union has redistributive preferences. A less formalized way of picturing the same
phenomenon is to rely on arguments concerning union solidarity and ideology. By narrowing
wage differentials between labour union members, it may increase the welfare of risk-averse
workers by providing social insurance from a long-run perspective. See also Horn and Svensson
(1986) and Rees (1993).
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Egger and Kreickemeier (2005) have used the “fairness” approach to efficiency wages,
decided by firms when the efficiency wage is derived based on a  “fairness” constraint
(see e.g. Akerlof and Yellen (1990)), in a model of international outsourcing where the
wage inequality and unemployment rate are determined simultaneously. In such a
framework they argue that the fairness constraint is binding for the low-skilled workers,
giving rise to unemployment of this group, while high-skilled workers face no
unemployment in equilibrium.
Given the amount of outsourcing, the monopoly labour union sets wages both for
the high-skilled and low-skilled workers so as to maximize the weighted surplus to its
heterogeneous members according to
{ HbwLbwU HHLL
LwHw
))(1()(max
),(
--+-= aa                                                        (9)
                   s.t. 0=Hp  and 0=Lp         .
The first-order conditions associated with (9) can be written as
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Using the first-order conditions characterizing the high-skilled and low-skilled
labour demand we have the following relationships between the high-skilled and low-
skilled labour: 1)1()1( -+-= m
w
w
a
a
H
L
L
H g  and ( )m
w
w
a
a
L
H
H
L g+
-
= 1
)1(
, where
LMm /º . Substituting these into equations (10a) and (10b) gives, after some
rearrangements, the following optimal wage set by the monopoly labour union for the
high-skilled labour (see Appendix B)
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The comparative statics in terms of m  (the ratio between outsourcing and low-
skilled labour) and a  (the labour union’s relative preference for the low-skilled
workers) can be expressed as
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A higher ratio of outsourcing to low-skilled labour increases the wage for high-skilled
workers. In terms of the effect of expanded outsourcing we have the same qualitative
finding, i.e. 01*
**
>
¶
¶=
¶
¶
Lm
w
M
w HH . Further, from (12b) we see that the wage for the high-
skilled workers depends negatively on the degree of wage solidarity of the monopoly
labour union.
In a similar way the optimal wage set by the monopoly labour union for the low-
skilled labour can be expressed as (see Appendix B)
[ ] LL bama
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gaa  .                        (13)
The comparative statics for the low-skilled wage with respect to m  and a  is found to
be
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A higher ratio of outsourcing to the low-skilled labour will decrease the wage rate of
low-skilled workers. In terms of the effect of expanded outsourcing we have the same
qualitative finding, i.e. 01*
**
<
¶
¶=
¶
¶
Lm
w
M
w LL . Further, from (14b) we see that the wage for
the low-skilled workers depends positively on the degree of wage solidarity of the
monopoly labour union.
In particular, if the labour union operates with no solidaristic objectives (
2
1
=a )
we find from (11) and (13) that the wages are given by
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Under the plausible assumption LH bb ³  we can directly see that )2
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By combination of (12a) and (14a) we can infer that outsourcing induces an
increase in the wage dispersion between the high-skilled and low-skilled workers.
Similarly, comparing (12b) with (14b) verifies the natural property that increased wage
solidarity will reduce the wage dispersion between the two labour market segments.
These predictions both seem to theoretically confirm common views. Interestingly, by
investigating the derivative of the wage dispersion with respect to the parameter
capturing wage solidarity we find that
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This means that wage solidarity serves as an instrument with the effect of increasing,
and not decreasing, the tendency of outsourcing to increase wage dispersion. In this
respect wage solidarity tends to magnify the dispersion-increasing effect of
outsourcing. This feature can intuitively be explained as follows. A higher degree of
wage solidarity raises the wage for the low-skilled workers. But, under such
circumstances the strengthened discipline imposed by increased outsourcing will have a
stronger wage-reducing effect.
We now summarize our analysis of the wage formation as follows.
Proposition 2 In the presence of outsourcing
(a) a higher share of outsourced production will decrease the wage for the low-
skilled labour and increase it for the high-skilled labour, thereby inducing
increased wage dispersion, whereas
(b) a higher degree of wage solidarity will increase the wage for the low-skilled
labour and decrease it for the high-skilled labour, thereby reducing the wage
dispersion.
(c) a higher degree of wage solidarity magnifies the dispersion-enhancing effects
of outsourcing.
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Proposition 2 (c) has interesting implications for labour unions concerned with
threats imposed by outsourcing. From Proposition 2 (c) we can conclude that the labour
union would actually promote, not dampen, the wage dispersion induced by
outsourcing if it increased the degree of wage solidarity in face of this threat.
A large spectrum of empirical studies offers evidence in support of the hypothesis
that outsourcing increases wage dispersion. Feenstra and Hanson (1999, 2001) have
empirically studied the impact of foreign outsourcing on wages. According to their
findings, based on data from U.S. and other countries, wages of the low-skilled workers
have fallen relative to those of the high-skilled workers as a consequence of foreign
outsourcing. Also Wood’s (1998) review about developed countries argues that the
evidence is in fact mostly consistent with the hypothesis that the main cause of the rise
in labour market inequality is globalization. Hijzen et.al (2005) have provided evidence
from UK data that international outsourcing is an important component in explaining
changes in the skill structure of manufacturing industries. Geishecker and Görg (2004)
have found evidence that outsourcing has reduced real wages for workers in the lowest
skill categories, while it has increased real wages for the high-skilled workers by using
data from Germany. Hijzen et al (2003) have also found evidence, using data from UK,
that outsourcing plays an important role in explaining UK wage inequality. They argue
that outsourcing accounts for approximately half of the increase in domestic wage
inequality. Munch and Skaksen (2005) have used data from Denmark to provide
evidence that foreign outsourcing tends to reduce wages for the low and medium-
skilled workers, while it raises wages for the high-skilled workers. Recently, Dreher
and Gaston (2006) have used panel data over the period 1970-2000 to study, for
example, the effects of globalization on wage inequality. They have found that the
economic dimension has exacerbated industrial wage inequality in developed countries,
but the impact of globalization on inequality in less-developed countries has been quite
small.
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V.   Effects of Outsourcing and Wage Solidarity on Equilibrium
Unemployment
 So far we have studied wage formation within a partial equilibrium framework.
We now extend our analysis to a general equilibrium setting, where the labour force is
mobile across industries, in order to characterize the effects of outsourcing and wage
solidarity across labour market segments on equilibrium unemployment.
Consider a representative industry. According to (11) and (13) the labour union
sets the wages according to
iii bw A=                               (15)
for labour market segment i (i=H,L), where the mark-up factors are
[ ])1()1)(1(
)1)(1(
ama
mAH -++-
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and
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+
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ga ,
respectively. We assume that all industries are identical and for that reason neglect
industry-specific indices. In a general equilibrium context with labour mobility across
identical industries, but no mobility across different labour market segments, the
endogenous outside option for the labour union representing segment i, ib , is now
interpreted to be
iiiii Buwub +-= )1( ,                              (16)
where iu  denotes the unemployment rate in segment i, iB  denotes the unemployment
16
benefit for workers of type i and iw  denotes the wage determined by the union for
workers of type i.5
From (16) we can immediately infer that outsourcing and wage solidarity will
impact on the outside option available to the labour union in a general equilibrium
context through several mechanisms. In the subsequent analysis we will analyze these
effects in order to evaluate the overall employment consequences.
In line with the literature we restrict ourselves to a benefit-replacement ratio
ii wBq /º , which is constant across the two labour market segments. Combining (15)
and (16) the equilibrium unemployment iu  in labour market segment i can be found
to be given by
q
Au ii -
-
=
1
11
. (17)
According to (17) the equilibrium unemployment in each segment depends positively
both on the benefit-replacement ratio ( q ) and on the wage mark-up in the labour
market.6 By substituting the wage mark-ups from (11) and (13) into (17) we can
explicitly characterize the equilibrium unemployment in each of the segments, given
outsourcing.7
For the high-skilled labour force we find that the equilibrium unemployment is
given by
5 For a standard justification of this interpretation with a homogeneous labour force, see e.g. Nickell
and Layard (1999) p. 3048-3049 for a further discussion.
6 The unemployment rate satisfies 10 << iu  if and only if
iA
q 1< , which we assume to hold
throughout the analysis.
7   Egger and Egger (2006) have presented first insights on the role of international outsourcing
(international fragmentation of the value-added chain) for the productivity of low-skilled workers
in EU manufacturing. Their short-run evidence exerts a negative marginal effect on real value
added per low-skilled worker, while their long-run parameter estimates reveal a positive impact of
outsourcing on real value added per low-skilled worker.
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From (18) we can directly conclude that outsourcing the low-skilled tasks tends to
increase equilibrium unemployment ( 0>
¶
¶
m
uH ) in the segment of high-skilled workers.
Intuitively, this follows from the wage-increasing effect of outsourcing for the high-
skilled workers, which was established in (12a). Moreover, straightforward calculations
establish that increased wage solidarity reduces equilibrium unemployment for high-
skilled workers ( 0<
¶
¶
a
Hu ). This follows from the wage-decreasing effect on high-
skilled workers of a higher degree of wage solidarity, which was established in (12b).
For the low-skilled labour force we can calculate the equilibrium unemployment
to be
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From (19) we can directly characterize the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity
on equilibrium unemployment among the low-skilled workers. By (14a) outsourcing
was found to impose wage discipline and thereby to have a wage-moderating effect for
low-skilled workers. Consistent with this argument, (19) formally verifies that
outsourcing reduces equilibrium unemployment in the segment for low-skilled workers
( 0<
¶
¶
m
uL ). Further, increased wage solidarity, and thereby a higher relative preference
for the wages of low-skilled workers, increases the equilibrium unemployment among
low-skilled workers ( 0>
¶
¶
a
Lu ). This holds true because an increased degree of wage
solidarity induces an increase in the wage for the low-skilled workers, which was
established in (14b). Thus, we can see that outsourcing and wage-solidarity affect
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employment among low-skilled workers in a way which is completely opposite to the
effects on high-skilled workers.
We summarize these findings in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Outsourcing and wage solidarity have opposite employment effects
among the high-skilled and low-skilled workers.
(a) Higher outsourcing increases equilibrium unemployment among the high-
skilled workers, whereas it reduces it among the low-skilled workers.
(b) Higher wage solidarity reduces equilibrium unemployment for the high-skilled
workers, whereas it increases equilibrium unemployment for the low-skilled
workers.
In Proposition 3 we formulate conclusions which seem to be contrary to common
views regarding the effects of outsourcing. Namely, in the public debate outsourcing is
often seen to impose a particular threat for the low-skilled workers. As our analysis
establishes, such a view fail to take account of how a rational labour union with
bargaining power would respond to a firm’s commitment to outsourcing. Since
outsourced production and in-house production with domestic low-skilled workers are
substitutes outsourcing induces a wage-moderating effect on the wage for low-skilled
workers, which promotes employment in this segment of the labour force. The opposite
employment effect of outsourcing on high-skilled workers can be explained by the fact
that outsourcing has an opposite effect on the wage formation for the high-skilled
workers.
Union leaders often justify policies with wage solidarity by reference to particular
concerns for the low-skilled workers. In light of our analysis it seems highly
questionable whether low-skilled workers would benefit from wage solidarity, at least
in the presence of outsourcing. As we have demonstrated, an increased degree of wage
solidarity would tend to burden the employment opportunities for low-skilled workers
by increasing the equilibrium unemployment in this labour force segment.
Our model is designed in such a way that the equilibrium unemployment would
be equal in the two labour force segments in the absence of outsourcing (m=0) and
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under circumstances with no relative labour union preferences across the two labour
force segments (
2
1
=a  ). More precisely, by substituting m=0 and
2
1
=a  into (18) and
(19) we find that
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We next separate both the effects of wage solidarity in the absence of outsourcing
and the effects of outsourcing with no wage solidarity. For that reason we initially focus
on a configuration with wage solidarity but no outsourcing, i.e. where m=0.
Substitution of m=0 into (18) and (19) shows that
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which is strictly decreasing as a function of a  for
2
1
³a . Thus, in combination with
(20) we can conclude
Corollary 1 The equilibrium unemployment is higher among the low-skilled
workers than among the high-skilled workers in the absence of outsourcing.
Furthermore, this effect is stronger the stronger is the union’s relative preference
in favour of the low-skilled workers.
Essentially, in the absence of outsourcing wage solidarity leads the labour
union to increase the wage for the low-skilled workers to such an extent that
employment in this category of workers suffers. However, the presence of
outsourcing imposes discipline on wage formation for low-skilled workers. For
the case with no wage solidarity, i.e. with
2
1
=a  , we find that
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which is a strictly increasing function of m . Thus, we can conclude
Corollary 2 The presence of outsourcing without wage solidarity imposes so
much negative pressure on the wages of the low-skilled workers that the
equilibrium unemployment is higher for the high-skilled workers. This effect is
stronger the higher is the amount of outsourcing.
So far we have explored separately the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity
on equilibrium unemployment in the two labour force segments. In particular, we have
found that these effects are opposite in the two segments. We will next evaluate the
total effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on equilibrium unemployment in an
economy consisting of both labour force segments.
Assume that the proportion Hn  of the labour force belong to the high-skilled
segment, whereas the complementary proportion HL nn -= 1  are low-skilled workers.
In such an economy the equilibrium unemployment for the economy with
heterogeneous workers is the weighted average of the unemployment rates in the two
different labour force segments according to
),()1(),(),( anana mumumu LHHH -+=   .                  (23)
In the next proposition we establish that the total effects of outsourcing and wage
solidarity are crucially determined by the relative proportions of the two labour force
segments.
Proposition 4
(a) Increased outsourcing reduces equilibrium unemployment if and only if the
proportion of the high-skilled workers is sufficiently low. Formally,
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The threshold Hvˆ  is a decreasing function of the degree of wage solidarity.
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(b) A higher degree of wage solidarity raises equilibrium unemployment if and
only if the proportion of the high-skilled workers is sufficiently low. Formally,
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¶   .
 The threshold Hv~  is a decreasing function of the degree of outsourcing.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Proposition 4(a) essentially states that outsourcing will reduce equilibrium
unemployment under the reasonable condition that the proportion of high-skilled
workers is sufficiently low. The threshold
)1()12()1(
))1(1()1(ˆ
aar
ra
n
-+--
---
=
a
a
H  , below
which this conclusion holds true, depends on the degree of wage solidarity in important
ways. Based on straightforward calculations it can be verified that this threshold is
strictly decreasing as a function of the degree of wage solidarity. Consequently, the
effect of outsourcing on equilibrium unemployment depends monotonically on the
degree of wage solidarity. For outsourcing to promote employment the upper threshold
for the proportion of high-skilled workers is reduced if the degree of wage solidarity is
increased.
From Proposition 4(b) we can conclude that a higher degree of wage solidarity
burdens employment when the proportion of the high-skilled workers is sufficiently
low. For this to happen the threshold is given by
)1()1(
))1(1()1(1
1~
2
2
ma
aH
ga
raa
n
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+
= . The effects on equilibrium unemployment of
an increasing degree of wage solidarity exhibit a systematic relationship with
outsourcing. More precisely, increased outsourcing lowers the threshold below which
an increased degree of wage solidarity raises equilibrium unemployment.
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VI.   Optimal Committed Outsourcing: The Long-run Perspective
So far we have restricted ourselves to a medium- or short-run perspective, where
the firms have committed to the magnitude of their outsourcing activities. We now turn
to explore the initial stage, where the firm commits itself to the outsourcing activity.
We characterize how the labour market imperfections affect the equilibrium production
mode. It is assumed that the long-run production modes decision internalizes the effects
of the share of outsourced production on the wages of the high-skilled and low-skilled
workers.
In the long run the firm determines the magnitude of outsourcing so as to
maximize profit. The firm has rational expectations regarding the subsequent outcomes
with respect to the high-skilled and low-skilled wages and employment so that the
production mode internalizes the effects of the share of outsourced production on
wages and employments. The long-run production mode is determined by the following
optimization problem
{ =p
)(M
Max )(),,(),,( MgcMLwHwMLHFMLH LH ----=p (24)
s.t. 0,0,0 === Hww LH UU p  and 0=Lp ,
where the constraints capture that the production mode is set in anticipation of
subsequent wage formation and employment in terms of both the high-skilled and low-
skilled workers.
By applying the envelope theorem we get the following first order condition for
the optimal amount of committed outsourcing associated with the optimization problem
(24)
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where 0*
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w LL . Hence, in addition to the
direct marginal cost )(' Mgc + , and the direct marginal profit
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introducing outsourcing will increase the wage cost of the high-skilled labour, while it
will decrease the wage cost of the low-skilled labour. These findings lie in conformity
with empirics, as we have mentioned earlier. If the ratio between the optimal high-
skilled labour and the optimal low-skilled labour is small enough (large enough), then
the presence of labour market imperfections increases (decreases) the returns from M
because outsourcing has wage cost-moderating (wage cost-raising) effect, i.e.
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We can now characterize how the labour union’s relative focus on low-skilled workers
affects optimal outsourcing by reporting the following comparative statics result.
Proposition 5
A higher relative focus by the monopoly labour union on low-skilled workers will
(a) increase the returns from outsourcing via the wage-moderating effect for low-
skilled workers, and
(b) decrease the returns from outsourcing via the wage-increasing effect for high-
skilled workers.
Proof: See Appendix D.
VII.   Conclusions
We have studied the consequences of outsourcing and wage solidarity on labour
demand, wage dispersion, equilibrium unemployment as well as the incentives
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associated with the introduction of outsourcing.  We have shown that both the own
wage elasticity and the cross wage elasticity as well as the outsourcing elasticity of the
low-skilled labour demand depend positively on the amount of outsourcing, while both
the own wage elasticity and the cross wage elasticity as well as the outsourcing
elasticity of the high-skilled labour demand are independent of the amount of
outsourcing. In terms of wage formation by the monopoly labour union a higher share
of outsourced production will decrease the wage rate by the low-skilled labour, and
increase the wage rate by the high-skilled labour so that the home wage difference
becomes higher. The monopoly labour union’s higher wage solidarity for the low-
skilled labour will increase (decrease) the wage rate of the low-skilled (high-skilled)
labour.
Higher outsourcing increases equilibrium unemployment among the high-
skilled workers, whereas it reduces it among the low-skilled workers. Increased wage
solidarity reduces equilibrium unemployment for the high-skilled workers, whereas it
increases equilibrium unemployment for the low-skilled workers. Increased wage
solidarity reduces equilibrium unemployment for the high-skilled workers, whereas it
increases equilibrium unemployment for the low-skilled workers. Increased outsourcing
increases equilibrium unemployment among the high-skilled workers, whereas it
reduces it among the low-skilled workers. Increased wage solidarity reduces
equilibrium unemployment for the high-skilled workers, whereas it increases
equilibrium unemployment for the low-skilled workers. Finally, in terms of optimal
production mode a higher relative focus by the monopoly labor union on low-skilled
workers will decrease the returns from outsourcing via the wage-increasing effects for
low-skilled workers.
We have analyzed the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on wage
formation and equilibrium unemployment. Likewise we have characterized the effect of
wage solidarity on the optimal production mode with heterogeneous workers in the
encompassing labour union. An important further research topic is to ask: What are the
incentives of heterogeneous labour force segments to merge and negotiate the wage
agreement as a unified labour union rather than as separate unions if the firms have
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access to production though international outsourcing? Horn and Wolinsky (1988) have
earlier studied this issue in a different model without outsourcing,
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Appendix A: Optimal low-skilled labour demand
Substituting the RHS of (4) for H  in (3b) gives
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so that
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which gives (5). QED.
Appendix B: Wage formation by monopoly labour union
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Equation (B2) can be re-expressed as follows
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Substituting the right hand side of (B3) for ÷÷
ø
ö
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è
æ
-
L
L
w
b1  in (B1) gives after some
rearrangements the following optimal monopoly labour union wage for the high-skilled
labor
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Using the wage elasticities, presented earlier, we have
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the text.
Equation (B1) can be re-expressed as follows
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Substituting the right hand side of (B3) for ÷÷
ø
ö
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w
b1  into (B2) gives after some
rearrangements the following optimal wage for the low-skilled labour
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Using the wage elasticities, presented earlier, (B6) it can be also expressed in equation
(13) of the text. QED.
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Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 4
In order to explore the effects of outsourcing on the economy-wide unemployment rate
we make use of straightforward calculations to form the derivative
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It should be emphasized that the threshold ] [1,0ˆ ÎHv  .
Further, in order to characterize the effects of an increased degree of wage solidarity on
economy-wide unemployment we observe that
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Substituting (C3)  and (C4) into (C2) we can conclude that
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Again it can directly be seen from (C5) that ] [1,0~ ÎHv  .QED.
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Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 5
The first-order condition (25) for the optimal production mode can be characterized by
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What is the effect of the labour union’s relative preference for the low-skilled workers
on the firm’s optimal outsourcing? Differentiating (14a) with respect to a  gives
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 so that higher a  will decrease the returns from outsourcing via
the wage formation of low-skilled workers. Differentiating (12a) with respect to a  and
denoting
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After some rearrangements (D3) can be written as
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The expression
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A sufficient, but not necessary condition for 0)(
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 so that higher a  will increase the cost from outsourcing via the wage
formation of high-skilled workers. QED.
